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WHEN IS A POLICE OFFICER AN OFFICER
OF THE LAW?: THE STATUS OF POLICE

OFFICERS IN SCHOOLS
PETER PRICE*
A key component of the "school to prison pipeline" is the constant
presence of police, officers in schools. School resource officers, though
employed by the school district rather than the police department, should
be treated legally as police officers, requiring them to follow commonly
accepted standards of police conduct in investigating and interrogating
crime in schools. This approach is better for all players in the school
discipline scene: school officials, police officers and, most importantly,
students.
I. INTRODUCTION

In March of 2005, a young girl threw a temper tantrum in
1
are hardly unusual for a kindergartner. 2
kindergarten.' Temper tantrums
Nonetheless, the school principal decided to call the police. 3 The police
chief cancelled the call, as he thought it was inappropriate for police to be
involved.4 However, a local police officer, Officer Wilson, had recently
visited the school and left his business card, so the principal called him
directly when the police refused to come. 5 Officer Wilson came to the

J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, May 2009. B.A., University
of Saint Thomas, May 1997.

1 Thomas C. Tobin, Police Might Alter Kid Policy,

ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,

Apr. 29,

2005, at IA.
2 As a former teacher, I have had to remove a kindergarten student from class and take
him to the principal's office. Taking a student to the principal's office is almost always an
indication of failure on the part of a teacher-inevitable failure, as teaching is tough
business, but failure nonetheless. In this instance, the sting of failure was double: the
offending kindergarten student was my own son.
3 Tobin, supra note 1.
4 id.

5 id.
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school and may have threatened to handcuff the girl if she did not comply
with the teacher's requests.6
A week later, this precocious young girl had yet another tantrum, only
this particular tantrum was extreme.7 She threw desk items, tore paper off
the wall, and even hit the assistant principal. 8 Once again, the school
decided to call the police. 9 This time, Officer Wilson heard the call over the
police radio. 10 Given his prior involvement with the girl and the school, he
decided to go directly to the school." The police supervisor did not cancel
the call this time, but was unaware of Officer Wilson's decision to go to the
school, and thus sent another car-resulting in a total of four police
officers, as Officer Wilson was riding with an officer in training arriving to
tackle this tough kindergartner.'" When the officers entered the classroom,
the girl was sitting quietly in her chair.' 3 Despite her calm, the officers
cuffed her and took her to the squad car.' 4 There she remained shackled for
three hours.' 5 Her first introduction to the criminal justice system, at age
five, is' an experience sure to stick with her for a long time, and is
emblematic of the school-to-prison pipeline.
In recent years, this pipeline has begun to gamer more attention. It has
had a disproportionate impact on poor and minority communities and has
dramatically increased the number of juveniles that pass through the
criminal justice system.16 Ironically, this increase has occurred at the same
time that overall and juvenile crime rates have declined.'" A critical
component of the pipeline is the role of police officers in the public schools.
Thus, this Comment will examine the legal status of School Resource
Officers (SROs) and other police officers who operate in schools. Part II
6

Id. The factual record on this point is in dispute. Id.

7 See id.
8id.

9 Id.
10 Id.
1 Id.
12 id.
13 Id.
14 Id.; see Videostream (Mar. 15, 2005), http://www.sptimes.com/2005/webspecials05/
child-video-streaming/classroom/small.shtml (documenting child's behavior in the assistant
principal's office and the officers' arrival and arrest).

15 NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, DISMANTLING THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE

14, http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/pipeline/dismantling.the-school-to-prisonpipeline.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2009).
16 ADVANCEMENT

JAILHOUSE TRACK

PROJECT,

EDUCATION

ON

LOCKDowN:

THE

SCHOOLHOUSE

TO

(2005), http://www.advancementproject.org/reports/FlNALEOLrep.pdf.

17 STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST
EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 119 (2005); NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC.

FUND, supra note 15, at 3.
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will give an outline of the history behind zero-tolerance school discipline
policies, the current prevalence of these policies, and of the use of SROs to
enforce such policies.
Part III will examine the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment implications of these policies. Part IV will examine the legal
status of police officers in current case law. Part V will recommend that
uniform standards apply to police officers who operate in schools, whether
those officers are SROs or not, with a legal and policy analysis to support
this conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE

The school-to-prison pipeline has developed as a result of several
educational and social factors. First, zero-tolerance discipline policies rose
to prominence in the early 1990s, due to the perception that crime in
schools was an increasingly large problem.1 8 Contrary to the perception
however, crime was actually decreasing. 19 Schools began implementing
many other policies as well, iricluding the increased reliance on police
presence within schools. 20 This Part will analyze these factors and some of
the practical ramifications of the increasing severity of punishment for
relatively harmless violations. One important factor to consider when
examining these various techniques is that of all the many disciplinary
programs tried in the past fifteen years, the only one with serious research
to support its effectiveness is the use of school uniforms. 2'
A. A HISTORY OF ZERO-TOLERANCE POLICIES

From 1975 to 1989, violent crime increased 80% nationwide; 22 that
increase had a severe impact on schools. In 1989, as schools began to take
notice of this crisis, school districts in California, New York, and Kentucky
adopted the first zero-tolerance school disciplinary policies, mandating
expulsion for fighting, drugs, and gang-related activity. 23 By 1993, zerotolerance policies had been implemented across the country. 24 In 1994,
President Clinton signed the Gun-Free Schools Act into law, which

18 RUSSELL J. SKIBA, IND. EDUC. POLICY CTR., POLICY RESEARCH REPORT No.
ZERO TOLERANCE, ZERO EVIDENCE: AN ANALYSIS

SRS2,

OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINARY PRACTICE

(2000), http://www.indiana.edu/-safeschl/ztze.pdf.
19 LEVITT & DUBNER, supra note 17, at 119; NAACP
note 15, at 3.
20 ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 16, at 7.
21 SKIBA, supra note 18, at 8-9.
22 LEVITT & DUBNER, supra note 17, at 119.
23 SKIBA, supra note 18, at 2.
24 id.

LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND,

2

supra
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mandated expulsion for gun offenses.2 5 Schools were required to abide by
this policy in order to receive federal funding.26 Subsequent amendments to
the bill have expanded it to include other weapons. 27
Additional
amendments have
attempted
to
bring
special
education
legislation
in line
28
policy.
this
with
Zero-tolerance policies have continued to expand at the local level to
apply to a variety of different behaviors, including smoking, drinking,
fighting, threats, and even swearing. 29 By 1997, 94% of all schools had
zero-tolerance policies for possession of firearms or other weapons, 87%
for alcohol possession, and 79% for tobacco possession and on-campus
violence. 30 As a result, rates for serious disciplinary consequences have
risen. In 2004, for example, over three million students were suspended at
some point during the school year, with rates of suspension as high as
11.9% for all students and 15.3% amongst boys.3 1 This rate is nearly twice
the annual number of suspensions that occurred in the 1970s.32
Additionally, over 106,000 expulsions occurred in 2004. 33 Of course,
certain cities and communities experience even higher suspension and
expulsion rates, for example, inner city schools in larger urban areas.34

25

Id.; Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat. 270 (codified as

amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. (2006)). The law does require cases to be
handled on a case-by-case basis, although the anecdotal evidence seems to indicate that this
rarely happens. Since all schools want and need federal funds, this is a de facto federal
mandate. 20 U.S.C. § 7151(b)(1) (2006).
26 20 U.S.C. § 7151 (b)(1).
27 SKIBA, supra note 18, at 2. The definition of a firearm includes any device that uses
an explosive as a projectile, or to send a projectile. As any part of such a weapon counts as a
violation, it can be construed quite broadly. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a) (2006).
28 SKIBA, supranote 18, at 2.
29 Id.; see, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18A-5-la (LexisNexis 2007) (mandating
suspension for a first-time drug offense, any weapon offense, or assault). First offenses may
also result in expulsion, and second offenses will always result in expulsion. Id.; cf Sally
Falk Nancrede, School to Take Foul Mouths to Task: Southport High Will Institute ZeroTolerance Policy on Profanity, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 20, 1998, at Al (discussing new
profanity policy at local high school).
30 SKIBA, supra note 18, at 3.
31 NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION

STATISTICS 2008, at 231 tbl.153 (2008), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2008/
2008022.pdf. Louisiana and South Carolina are the states that reported these high numbers.
Id.
32 NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, supra note 15, at 14.
33 NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 31, at 230 tbl. 152.
34 See, e.g., id. at 225 tbl.150 (showing that the use of various security measures
generally increases along with the size of the school, the number of students on free lunch,
and the urban character of the environment).
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Minority communities in particular have been disproportionally affected by
aggressive school disciplinary measures.3 5
Zero-tolerance programs started as a response to two primary issues
confronting schools, drugs and violence. Though the problems were and
are real, the response has not been in proportion to the reality, nor has it
been particularly effective. 36 Zero-tolerance programs began to proliferate
after crime in schools began to decrease.37 These policies have removed
much discretion from teachers and administrators in the application of
disciplinary procedures, producing several high-profile cases that have
resulted in ridiculous punishment. Though only one of the stories below
resulted in criminal sanction, they are all mentioned because, collectively,
facing schools: (1)
they highlight the three major concerns currently
38
weapons, (2) drugs and alcohol, and (3) violence.
In 1998, in Longmont, Colorado, a ten-year-old girl opened her lunch
to find that her mother had left a steak knife in her lunchbox. 39 This girl
knew that weapons were not allowed in school and did not want to get into
trouble.40 She immediately told one of her teachers about the knife and
turned it in.4 1 She did not intentionally bring the knife, she had no
knowledge of it until lunch, she had no prior record, she immediately turned
the knife over to school authorities upon discovery, and she was only ten
years old; nonetheless, the school expelled her.42
In another case the same year, a second-grade student in Denver,
Colorado was given chewable vitamin C by his mother on the way to
4
school. 43 Without her knowledge, he pocketed an extra pill. " A friend at

35 NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, supra note 15, at 6-9.
36 SKIBA, supra note 18, at 7-11.
37 See LEVITT & DUBNER, supra note 17, at 119 (noting that crime began to fall
precipitously in the 1990s); SKIBA, supra note 18, at 5 (noting that zero-tolerance policies
began to increase at the same time).
38 SKIBA, supra note 18, at 4-9; Ronnie Casella, Zero Tolerance Policy in Schools:
Rationale, Consequences, and Alternatives, 105 TCHRS C. REc. 872, 874-78 (2005)

(discussing rationales for zero-tolerance policies).
39 Katherine Vogt, School Votes It Can't Reinstate Expelled Girl, DENVER POST, Feb. 2,
1998, at IA.
40 Jesse Katz, Taking Zero Tolerance to the Limit, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1998, at Al.
41 Vogt, supra note 39.

42Katz, supra note 40. The board later reinstated the student, but she transferred to a
different school. Cf Elizabeth A. Brandenburg, Comment, School Bullies-They Aren't Just
Students: Examining School Interrogationsand the Miranda Warning, 59 MERCER L. REV.
731, 731-32 (2008) (describing a similar story in Georgia).
43 Vitamin Spurs School Suspension: Tablet Offered to Loveland Classmate, DENVER
POST, June 4, 1998, at 5B.
44 Id.
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school began harassing him to give her the vitamin, and he did.45 The
school suspended him for his transgression.4 6 Using discretion, the
principal decided not to expel him, but the fact that expulsion was even an
option for such an offense only highlights the extreme punishments
available for relatively minor offenses. 7
Though these Colorado cases seem extreme, one incident in Florida
was particularly disturbing. In the spring of 2007, a six-year-old girl in
Avon Park, Florida named Desre'e Watson threw a tantrum in school.48
She was violent and defiant. 49 The teachers removed her to another room,
but she continued her behavior.50 The administrators then called the
police; 5' the police cuffed and arrested Desre'e, booked her, and
fingerprinted her. 52 Desre'e was then charged with "battery on a school
disruption of a school
official," which is a felony, and two misdemeanors:
53
function and resisting a law enforcement officer.,
When Bob Herbert of the New York Times said to the police chief
"[b]ut she was six," the chief responded immediately, "Do you think this is
the first six year-old we've arrested? ' 54 As Herbert insightfully notes, once
you begin to see ordinary childhood misbehavior as criminal, "it's easy to
start seeing young children as somehow monstrous. 'Believe me when I tell
you,' said Chief Mercurio, 'a six year-old can inflict injury to you just as
much as any other person."' 55 It is this prism of criminality and fear that
56
has driven so many zero-tolerance policies and other security measures.
These stories illustrate a shift in educational priorities. No longer is
education the primary goal; rather, the system emphasizes controlling
children who are viewed as dangerous, even in kindergarten.57
45 Id.
46

Id.

47

Id.

48Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., 6-Year-Olds Under Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2007, at A17,
availableat http://select.nytimes.com/2007/04/09/opinion/09herbert.html.
49 Id.

50 Id.
51
52

Id.
Id.

53 Id.

54Id.
55Id.

supra note 18, at 7-11 (noting that none of these policies have proven to be
particularly effective); David Altheide, The News Media, the Problem Frame, and the
Production of Fear, 38 Soc. Q. 647 (1997) (observing that the public's fear of social ills
increases as the news media coverage increases). In fact, drug use has remained stagnant or
increased since the first zero-tolerance policies were implemented in 1989. NAT'L CTR. FOR
EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 31, at 233 tbls. 155-56.
57 Of course, most educators are interested in educating all their students. But educators,
56 SKIBA,
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B. CRIME AND DRUGS-PERCEPTION VERSUS REALITY

By the 1980s, many school districts were in crisis. Violence was high,
and teacher morale was low. This situation garnered much popular
attention through movies such as Stand and Deliver and Lean on Me in the
late 1980s and early

1990s.

58

These movies depicted teachers and

principals reshaping institutions through their sheer force of will.5 9 This
reinforced the notion that what schools really needed to do to solve the
epidemic of crime and violence was to "get tough."
Further, as the years went on, extended media attention to crimes such
as the Columbine killings fueled popular perception that schools were
reaching a breaking point.60 This attention only accelerated the pace of
zero-tolerance adoption in schools, and the increased use of security
measures such as metal detectors, police officers on campus, and other
measures. Yet, by the time zero-tolerance policies began to take hold in
education,6 1 the violence was already subsiding. Crime in school, and
outside of the school walls, dropped significantly in the 1990s, dropping by
half in schools between 1992 and 2002.62
Similarly, drug and alcohol use in schools dropped signficantly
throughout the 1980s. 63 Although alcohol usage rates have dropped since
1990, the use of drugs has fluctuated since the implementation of zerotolerance policies and is now roughly the same as it was in 1990.64 The fact
that drug use dropped rapidly prior to zero-tolerance policies, but has since

especially in public schools, must abide by an ever-increasing body of law that shifts the
focus from educational achievement to behavioral management.
58 LEAN ON ME (Warner Bros. Pictures 1989); STAND AND DELIVER (Warner Bros.
Pictures 1988).
59 For example, Lean on Me featured Morgan Freeman as Joe Clark, a real-life principal
who turned around a decaying inner city school in New York through the liberal use of
tough, no-nonsense policies. LEAN ON ME, supra note 58.
60 A LexisNexis search of all news sources for the ten days after the attack (on April 20,
1999) yields over 500 hits and, if the search is extended to six weeks after the attacks, over
3,000 hits. By comparison, a terrorist bombing at the "Valley of the Fallen" Church that
same month garnered only three hits.
61Zero-tolerance policies first appeared in schools in 1989, and within five years they
were nearly universal. SKIBA, supra note 18, at 2.
62 ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 16, at 11.

But see NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC.

76 tbl.4.1 (indicating
increase in students encountering weapons in school during that same time period).
STATISTICS, INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2005, at

an

63 NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 31, at 234 tbl.156.

64 Id. Usage rates for certain drugs, such as LSD and cocaine, are lower, while usage
rates for others, such as marijuana and heroin, are higher. The overall usage rate, or
percentage of students who reported having used drugs at least once, for the class of 1990
was 47.9%; the class of 2006 had a usage rate of 48.2%. Id.
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leveled off or increased slightly, calls the efficacy of zero-tolerance policies
into question.
Despite the rapid drop in crime and drug usage rates within schools,
the public perception was that school crime and drug usage rates continued
to increase, fueling the continued expansion of zero-tolerance policies to
include more behaviors.6 5 Not coincidentally reporting on crime generally
spiked at the moment that crime in and out of schools was dropping,
pushing crime to the forefront of the national conscience.6 6 This increased
fear of crime and drugs, particularly in schools, helped garner support for
the continued expansion of zero-tolerance policies, along with an increase
in other security measures, such as the increased presence of police officers
in schools.
C. SUMMARY OF THE INCREASED PRESENCE OF POLICE IN SCHOOLS
In addition to zero-tolerance programs, schools adopted a number of
other solutions to the problems of in-school violence and drug use.67 One
common choice has been to increase police presence in schools at all levels.
During the 2003-2004 school year, nearly 54% of all public secondary
schools had a daily police presence.68 The same year over 70% of students
between the ages of twelve and eighteen reported at least some police
presence within their school, an increase of nearly 30% since just 1999.69
Three factors are predictors for a daily police presence: (1) school size,7 ° (2)
percentage of children receiving reduced price school lunch, 71 and (3)
school location,72with urban environments having a larger police presence
than rural ones.
65
66

Altheide, supra note 56, at 649.
Id. (citing David Shaw, Headlines and High Anxiety, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1994, at

Al). In the same year that "for the first time, ABC, CBS and NBC nightly news programs
devoted more time to crime than to any other topic," Americans told pollsters for the first
time that "crime is 'the most important problem facing the country."' Shaw, supra. Figures
are unavailable for reporting on crime within schools specifically, but it is not an
unreasonable assumption that such reporting increased as well.
67 SKIBA, supra note 18, at 3. Other methods include
controlled access to buildings,
sign-in and sign-out policies, closed campus for lunch, mandatory school uniforms, and
random or daily metal detectors. Id.
68
69
70

NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 31, at 225 tbl. 150.
NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 62, at 63 fig.21.1.
NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 3 1, at 225 tbl. 150. Note that school size

may actually be a duplicative factor. Secondary schools are far more likely than elementary
schools to have a police presence, and they are also more likely to have larger student
populations. To my knowledge, there are few, if any, elementary schools with 1,000 or more
students, yet such a large student population is fairly common for high schools.
71 Id. The correlation is direct.
72 Id.
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D. CONSEQUENCES OF ZERO-TOLERANCE POLICIES AND AN
INCREASED POLICE PRESENCE IN SCHOOLS
The increase in police at a time when school violence has dropped so
dramatically has led to inevitable outcomes. Police presence at schools
must be justified by action, and therefore there has been a marked increase
in the criminalization of infractions that would have been previously
handled by school officials. For example, in one Texas school district, 17%
of school arrests were for disruptive behavior, and 26% were for disorderly
conduct.73 This has dramatically increased the number of interactions that
children, particularly those in low-income and minority communities, have
with police officers in their lifetimes.74
Further, as any good teacher knows, if you reach for your most serious
punishment too soon in the year, you have lost the class. 75 As disciplinary
decisions and use of criminal sanctions for minor offenses increase, respect
for the criminal arrest process may lessen. One can imagine a student
thinking that if a kindergarten student is shackled in the back of a police
cruiser for a temper tantrum, maybe being shackled by police is not such a
big deal. In fact, there is now significant statistical support for this notion,
as students in the communities with the most consistent police presence in
schools are most likely to evince less respect for police and are far less
likely to be "scared straight" by an encounter with police outside of
school.7 6
All of these factors-increased reliance on zero-tolerance policies,
increased use of police officers in schools (commonly referred to as School
Resource Officers or SROs), the decrease in crime and drug use in schools,
and the increased use of criminal sanctions for school disciplinary
procedures-have raised a number of legal issues.77 Most critically,

73 ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 16, at

15.

74 Id. at 23. Denver referrals to the criminal justice system as a result of public-school
conduct increased by 71% from 2000-2004. Id.
75 See, e.g., Paul Pedota, Strategies for Effective Classroom Management in the
Secondary Setting, CLEARING HOUSE, Mar.-Apr. 2007, at 163.

In handling student
discipline, "the worst thing you can do is act hastily" or, conversely, to wait to respond to
misbehavior until the only option is "harsh punishment." Id. at 165.
76 HARVARD UNIV. CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT & ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, OPPORTUNITIES
SUSPENDED:

THE

DEVASTATING

CONSEQUENCES

OF

ZERO

TOLERANCE

AND

SCHOOL

DISCIPLINE POLICIES 10-12 (2000) (describing the negative impact zero-tolerance policies
have on students' sense ofjustice and ability to form bonds with authority figures).
77 In addition to the status of police officers in schools, the focus of this Comment, there
are other Fourth and Fifth Amendment questions for searches and seizures and for
questioning done by school administrators. See Paul Holland, Schooling Miranda: Policing
Interrogation in the Twenty-First Century Schoolhouse, 52 LoY. L. REV. 39 (2006) (arguing
that in some circumstances teachers or administrators should give students Miranda
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students who are disciplined in schools are significantly more likely to face
consequences in the criminal justice system as a result of school actions.
This increase has been dubbed the school-to-prison pipeline. The higher
stakes for students, combined with their lack of sophistication, require a
more thoughtful and clear policy to set fair limits for criminal investigations
in schools.
III. THE

STAKES: LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF REDUCED STANDARDS

The increased use of criminal consequences for school-yard behavior
has raised the stakes considerably for students caught up in the search for
greater and greater deterrents. As these cases have reached the courts, they
have raised Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues. The consequences are
severe, and the learning outcomes for students who end up in the criminal
justice system are not encouraging. 78 This Part will analyze the current
state of the law regarding the Fourth and Fifth Amendment in school
settings. A careful analysis of these two issues will demonstrate why the
status of police officers and SROs is crucial to solving this problem.
A. MIRANDA RIGHTS IN SCHOOLS: WHO'S QUESTIONING WHO FOR
WHOM?
Courts have been divided over when interrogations of students within
school settings require the reading of their Miranda rights.7 9 One helpful
way of analyzing these cases is to borrow the People v. Dilworth court's
explanation of search and seizure cases. 80 The Illinois Supreme Court said
that such cases fell into three general categories: "(1) those where school
officials initiate a[n] [interrogation] or where police involvement is
minimal, (2) those involving school police or liaison officers acting on their
own authority, and (3) those where outside police officers initiate a[n]
[interrogation].'
In addition to these three categories, add a fourth: where

warnings before questioning); Eleftheria Keans, Note, Student Interrogations by School
Officials: Out with Agency Law and in with Constitutional Warnings, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 375 (2007) (drawing the same conclusion as Prof. Holland, but by applying the
Ferguson decision to the school setting); see also Michael Pinard, From the Classroom to
the Courtroom: Reassessing Fourth Amendment Standards in Public School Searches
Involving Law Enforcement Authorities, 45 ARIZ. L. REv. 1067 (2003) (suggesting more
rigorous Fourth Amendment standards when police are involved in school searches). Also,

there are a host of policy questions regarding the questionable effectiveness of such policies.
78 See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 16, at 12; NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC.
FUND, supra note 15, at 6.

79See Holland, supra note 77.
80 661 N.E.2d 310, 317 (Ill. 1996).
81Id. I have changed "search" to "interrogation" to fit the Miranda context.
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a situation exists in which SROs, outside police officers, or both are heavily
involved in the investigation but do so at the behest of school officials.
In the first category mentioned by the Dilworth court, school officials
act independently. Under this category, school officials then turn over
evidence to police if they find evidence of criminal behavior. In general,
there is unanimity that school officials do not have an automatic obligation
to Mirandize students in interrogations when school officials are acting on
their own initiative.82 The policy rationale is that school officials should
have wide latitude in disciplinary proceedings.8 3
The second category in the Dilworth court's analysis, those
investigations initiated by outside police officers, is at the other end of the
spectrum from the first category. In this case, since the investigation is
driven by outside police, courts have usually required Miranda warnings to
be given. 84 The rationale is that there is no reason that police officers
should be able to operate under different standards simply because they are
inside a school.
Between these two extremes are two other categories. For the fourth
category above, when outside police or SROs are acting at the behest of the
school, most courts have ruled that Miranda warnings are unnecessary. 85
Though not always using agency terminology, courts have essentially
treated the officers as agents of school officials and therefore not subject to
the normal constraints of police work.
Finally, the second Dilworth category is when an SRO has directed the
investigation on his or her own initiative. Courts have split on whether to
treat the officer as a school employee, in which case Miranda is not
82 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1369 (Mass. 1992) ("There is

no authority requiring a school administrator not acting on behalf of law enforcement
officials to furnish Miranda warnings.").
83 Though schools clearly need wide discretion in their own internal disciplinary
procedures, it is highly questionable whether this discretion ought to be given when it comes
to criminal matters. It results in an end run around the Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights
of students. Suspending or expelling a student on evidence obtained without a Miranda
warning or a search warrant is one thing, putting that student in jail is quite another. The
Supreme Court has hinted at this in Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995),
where the Court upheld policies requiring mandatory drug testing as a prerequisite for sports
participation because the consequences for the drug testing were related to school activities
only and did not involve turning evidence over to the police. However, despite this opinion,
it seems the settled law is that school officials need not issue Miranda warnings to students,
or worry about search and seizure protections.
84 Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d at 317.
85 State v. Tinkham, 719 A.2d 580 (N.H. 1998); State v. Dalziel, 867 A.2d 1167 (N.J.
2005); State v. Biancamano, 666 A.2d 199 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995), overruled on
other grounds, State v. Dalziel, 867 A.2d 1167 (N.J. 2005); In re Harold S., 731 A.2d 265
(R.I. 1999).
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86
required, or as a police officer, in which case it is.
Part IV will examine
these cases in greater detail.
Given how the courts have framed the issues, most of the discussion in
the decisions has focused on two factual issues: first, who began the
investigation-the school officials or the police; and second, who
conducted the investigation. 7 Whether these facts make any difference to
the student is highly dubious, but that has nonetheless been the focus of
courts.
Although the rubric above appears to be neat on the surface, different
courts have looked at relatively similar fact patterns and arrived at different
conclusions. This has muddied the waters considerably. In particular, the
definition of which SRO actions are "at the behest of' the school is
unclear. 8 Some courts have stretched this definition beyond recognition.
For example, in State v. Biancamano, the defendant ran a significant
drug operation. 89 Biancamano approached a fellow student, J.Z., to assist
him with his sale of LSD.90 They hid the drugs in a pen for distribution
within the school.91 Two other students, A.B. and T.T., were also involved
in the operation. 92 Less than a week after J.Z. began running drugs for
Biancamano, J.Z. was interviewed by William Cannici, the vice-principal,
regarding drug sales. 93 Cannici found the LSD tablets hidden in the pen,
after which J.Z. told Cannici he was running drugs for Biancamano.94
Cannici questioned Biancamano but did not search him. Biancamano
admitted to driving to school with A.B. that morning, supplying drugs to

86 Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363; Tinkham, 719 A.2d 580; Biancamano, 666 A.2d 199; In re

HaroldS., 731 A.2d 265.
87 See Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 583-84 (noting that the factual record did not include any
evidence that the police directed the principal to interview the student); see also Snyder, 597
N.E.2d at 1364 (indicating that Snyder's conviction was based on marijuana seized by
school officials); In re Harold S.,
731 A.2d at 266 (noting that although the police tipped the
school to Harold S.'s involvement in a fight, since the interview in which the signed
confession was obtained was conducted by a school official, the confession was usable
evidence). But see Biancamano, 666 A.2d at 203 (holding, without addressing agency
relationships, that "[s]chool officials are neither trained nor equipped to conduct police
investigations ....[T]he need to question students to determine the existence of weapons,
drugs, or potential violence in the school requires that latitude be given to school officials").
88 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985).
89 666 A.2d at 200 (observing that defendant told the assistant principal "he had given
100 'hits' to [his accomplice] over the previous two weeks" and that police found further
contraband in his home).
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 id.

93 Id.
94

Id.
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J.Z., and meeting with T.T.95 However, he claimed at trial that the
admission to selling drugs was "sarcastic. 96
Neither the vice-principal nor the assistant vice-principal searched the
student while interviewing him. 97 Although the interview lasted for over an
hour, the facts indicate that the defendant was free to leave.9 8 There was no
written confession, and the search of the defendant's home was not the
result of his own interview, but that of his accomplice, A.B., who told
Cannici where Biancamano had hidden his drugs. 99 The New Jersey
Superior Court ruled that school officials are unqualified to conduct
criminal investigations because they are "neither trained nor equipped to
conduct police investigations." ' 00 In other words, they are not subject to
Miranda requirements.'0 1
In a different case, State v. Tinkham, the student was suspected of
selling marijuana based on a report from another student who admitted
buying drugs from the defendant. 0 2 The principal and assistant principal
interviewed Tinkham, and then searched his book bag, pockets, socks, and
shoes. 0 3 This search produced a cylindrical wooden object, which was
turned over to police. 10 4 Eventually school officials compelled the student
to confess to the police in writing.'0 5 The record suggested that it was
standard practice for the principal to obtain confessions and then turn them
over to police, as the principal had told police in advance of her intention to
interrogate Tinkham.10 6 Since nothing in the record contradicts the
student's statement that his was a first-time offense, this suggests the
principal turned over evidence of any and all drug offenses at the school,
without ever exercising discretion. 0 7 The Ndw Hampshire Supreme Court
ruled that principal was "not a law enforcement officer.' 1 8 Additionally,

95 Id.
96 Id. at

202.

97 Id.

98 Id. at 200 (explaining that the vice-principal left the room briefly and that upon his
return, "defendant had already retrieved his car keys from the top of Cannici's desk and left
the building"). This did not factor in the court's decision, which decided that Miranda
warnings were not required based on other factors.
99 Id.

'00Id. at 203.
101Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363 (1992)).
'02 719 A.2d 580, 581 (N.H. 1998).
103Id.
104 Id.
115
106

Id. at 582.
Id. at 581.

107 Id.

'08Id.at 583.
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under agency law, the court further ruled that the principal was not "an
agent of the police." 10 9 The court considered irrelevant that "administrators
had every intention of turning the marihuana over to the police."11 The
only important issue was that there was no evidence that "Wolfeboro police
'
made any suggestions to [the principal] or directed her course of action."'11
With this analysis the court tried to fit the facts of the case squarely within
the first category given in Dilworth, investigations initiated and conducted
by school officials.' 12
As indicated by Tinkham, the question of agency between school
officials and police is a frequent issue in these cases.' 13 Two additional
cases illustrate the lengths to which courts will rule in favor of school
administrators' autonomy as to the issue of agency.
The first, Commonwealth v. Snyder, indicates a greater investigative
sophistication on the part of school administrators than that for which courts
had generally given them credit. 1 4 In Snyder, a student had reported that
Snyder showed the student three bags of marijuana hidden in a video
cassette inside his book bag.115 Upon finding Snyder in the student center,
school administrators decided that confrontation in that setting would limit
their ability to discover the full extent of the drug trade. 116 Thus they
waited until Snyder was in class and then searched his locker, where they
found marijuana.1 17 They interrogated him only after discovering the
drugs. 1 8 Armed with this specific information regarding his drug dealings,
eliciting a confession was relatively easy." 9 Despite the fact that it was
standard practice for school officials to turn evidence over to police, which
the court could have read to indicate that the school was performing a
was not required when the school
police function, the court said Miranda
20
administrators interrogated Snyder.

583-84.
1oId. at 584.
"' Id.
109 Id. at

112 661 N.E.2d 310, 317 (Il1. 1996).

v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1369 (Mass. 1992).
see State v. Biancamano, 666 A.2d 199, 203 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995)

113 See Commonwealth
114Id.;

(describing court's opinions of school administrators' powers of investigation).
1 Snyder, 597 N.E.2d at 1364.
116 Id.at 1365.
117

Id.

118

Id.

119 Id.
120

Id. at 1369 ("The fact that the school administrators had every intention of turning the

marihuana over to the police does not make them agents or instrumentalities of the police in
questioning Snyder.").
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In the second case, In re Harold S., the facts seem to describe a clear
case of school authorities acting as agents of the police, yet the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island thought differently. 121 The police approached the
principal before school -and "informed [the principal] that a fight had
occurred after school the previous day" and gave him the identities of the
"two students who allegedly were involved in the attack., 122 Harold S., a
middle school student, was accused of beating a fellow student. 1 23 The
victim accused Harold S., though he admitted he could not tell who had hit
him. 124 There were other witnesses that testified that Harold S. and an
accomplice had attacked the victim. 2 5 After the police made the principal
aware of the assault, the principal interviewed Harold S.126 The interview
eventually yielded a written confession, which the principal turned over to
the police "upon their request," as was his usual practice. 127 Despite this
was not acting
apparent agency relationship, the court ruled "the principal
128
as an agent of the police when he questioned respondent."'
The police
Several factors could indicate agency in this case.
approached the principal and notified him of the defendants' alleged
conduct. 129 Further, the police were furnished with the written confession
"upon their request."' 3 ° Finally, it was standard practice for the school to
"obtain statements from ...the alleged assailant" and turn them over to
police when requested.' 3' These three facts seem to indicate that police and
the school administrators were working closely together both generally and
specifically in this case. Yet, since "the officer was not present" during the
principal's meeting with the student, and the officer had not specifically
[the] respondent," the principal was not
asked the principal "to speak with
132
acting as an agent of the police.
Given the level of cooperation that courts allow between police and
school administrators without finding agency and without imposing

121 731 A.2d 265 (R.I. 1999).
122 Id.at 266.
123

Id.

124

Id. at 265.

125

Id.at 266.

126
127

id.
Id:

128

Id. at 267-68.

129

Id. at 266.

130Id.

'13
Id.at 267.
Id.

132

PETER PRICE

[Vol. 99

Miranda requirements, it is clear that
significant latitude is available for
33
police officers working for schools.
B. SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASES
Search and seizure cases are nearly always analyzed under New Jersey
v. T.L.O., in which the Supreme Court stated that when schools have acted
on their own initiative, they need only meet a standard of "reasonable
suspicion" to conduct a search. 134 T.L.O. was a high school student
suspected of smoking. 135 Rather than stating that she was not smoking at
the time, T.L.O asserted that she did not smoke. 36 This claim prompted the
school administrator to search her purse. 137 He found cigarettes when he
opened her purse, and based upon this evidence that she had lied, he
conducted a more thorough search of her purse.138 In the process, evidence
of marijuana use was discovered, and as a result of this discovery, criminal
charges were brought. 139 This is a key fact because there was no police
involvement until after the fact, and the original investigation was not
criminal in nature-the student was old enough to legally smoke and
possess cigarettes in New Jersey at the time. 140 However, she was violating
a school rule by smoking on campus. 141 Nonetheless, many, if not all,
courts have applied this decision to cases in which the school
administration, resource officers, and police clearly looked for criminal
violations from the beginning. 142
There are several other important holdings in T.L.O. The Court
established that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
133

Although the issue of agency relationships between school administrators is outside

the purview of this Comment, it is worth mentioning that the Supreme Court has ruled that
agency exists in similar relationships outside of schools. For example, in Ferguson v.
Charleston, the Court ruled that a hospital drug testing program for pregnant women which
turned over results to the police without consent was unconstitutional. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
The Court has upheld drug testing in a school context. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646 (1995). However, there were no criminal sanctions, only athletes were tested, the
consequence of a failed test was an inability to participate in athletics, and even this sanction
could be avoided with participation in a drug rehabilitation program. Id. at 651. For a
convincing argument that school officials should required to administer Mirandawarnings to
students, see Keans, supra note 77.
114 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985).
35 Id. at 328.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.

131 Id. at 328-29.
141 See id. at 344.
141 Id. at
142

331. Possession of cigarettes was not a violation of school rules.
See, e.g., infra Part III.A (discussing People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310 (Q11. 1996)).
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searches and seizures applies to those "conducted by public school
officials."'' 43 The Court noted that it had previously held other civil
authorities, such as firemen and Occupational Safety and Health Act
inspectors, to similar standards. 144 Additionally, the Court disapproved of
the in loco parentis analysis that other courts had used for school-based
issues, noting that "[s]uch reasoning is in tension with contemporary reality
and the teachings of this Court."' 145 Thus, it held that "school officials act as
representatives of the State."'' 46 Lastly, the Court also recognized that
students have a legitimate expectation of privacy in schools, noting that
although it may be difficult to maintain discipline in schools, "the situation
is not so dire that students in the schools may claim no legitimate
expectations of privacy." 147 The Court went on in detail regarding the many
personal, yet non-criminal items, such as wallets, purses, diaries,
letters,
148
grooming items, and others that students may need in school.
The T.L.O. Court delineated the key principles that it found to be in
tension with one another: a student's "legitimate expectations of privacy
and the school's equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in
which learning can take place."'' 49 Both warrant requirements and probable
cause standards were deemed inappropriate for school settings. 5 ' Instead,
the standard established was "reasonableness," which is determined by a
two-pronged test. Under this test, "first, one must consider whether
141 T.L.O., 469
'44

141
146
147

U.S.

at 333.

Id. at 335.
Id. at 336.
Id.
Id. at 338.

148 Id. at 339 ("Nor does the State's suggestion that children have no legitimate need to
bring personal property into the schools seem well anchored in reality. Students at a
minimum must bring to school not only the supplies needed for their studies, but also keys,
money, and the necessaries of personal hygiene and grooming. In addition, students may
carry on their persons or in purses or wallets such nondisruptive yet highly personal items as
photographs, letters, and diaries. Finally, students may have perfectly legitimate reasons to
carry with them articles of property needed in connection with extracurricular or recreational
activities.").
141 Id. at 340.

"So Id. at 340-41. This is a false dichotomy. In fact, another solution is possible outside
the realm of this Comment. Schools could be given wide authority to use a variety of means
to achieve school discipline as long as criminal sanctions were not involved, After all, the
key to keeping the school drug-free is to get the users and dealers out of the school, not to
put them in prison. In fact, given the indiscriminate nature of zero-tolerance policies, those
students who are making a "one-time" mistake will be just as likely to suffer severe criminal
sanctions as the recalcitrant repeat offender. Whether this serves the best interests of
educating all is a highly dubious presumption. The Court ruled the same in Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, when it upheld drug testing for student athletes, in part because it was
self-selecting group, and because no criminal sanctions were involved. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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the... action was justified at its inception; second, one must determine
whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."''
Finally, the Court in T.L.O. was careful to keep its ruling narrow, noting
that it was only addressing search and seizure cases in which the evidence
was "seized by a school official without the involvement of law
enforcement officers."' 52 Despite this limitation, many courts have been
unafraid to apply T.L.O. to cases with significant police involvement.
Although the Dilworth court's case categories are helpful, most school
search-and-seizure cases boil down to the issue of whether the school
administration or the police department directed the investigation. 15 3 Two
cases in which police tipped the school to the possibility of evidence of
criminal conduct within the school illustrate the courts' struggle with this
issue. 15 4 In In re P.E.A., an officer alerted the principal that two students
might have possessed marijuana. 155 The principal asked the officer to
remain at school while he investigated. 156 After the principal and school
security officer conducted a fruitless search of the two students in question,
they asked them how they came to school. 157 One of the two students said
that the other was driven to school by P.E.A. 158 They pulled P.E.A. out of
class and confirmed that he drove to school. 159 They then took his keys,
seized him physically, brought him to the parking lot, and searched his car
over his objection. 160 The Supreme Court of Colorado held that since the
officer "did not request or in any way participate in the searches or
interrogations of the students," the search did not "establish that the
principal and security officer acted as police agents."'' 6' The court therefore
analyzed the search under the T.L.O. standard of reasonableness and
determined that since P.E.A. drove one of the students implicated in the
151T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).
152 Id. at 331.
153661 N.E.2d 310, 317 (I1. 1996); see supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
114 In Re P.E.A., 754 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1988) (allowing a search of a student's car by
school officials based on a tip from police); F.P. v. State, 528 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1988)
(holding that searches at the behest of police require normal Fourth Amendment
protections).
"' 754 P.2d at 384 (noting that neither of the students implicated was P.E.A.).
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. The school's policy was to contact parents prior to searching a car when students
refused to consent to a search. The court did not comment on the lack of consent.
161 Id. at 385.
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officer's tip to school, there were reasonable grounds to search P.E.A.'s
car. 162

Importantly, the court found that no agency existed despite the fact
that the officer in question supplied the information "with the intent of
initiating the search."'' 63 It held so even though its own stated rationale for
agency was that the "agency rule prevents police from circumventing the
[F]ourth [A]mendment by having a private individual conduct a search or
make a seizure that would be unlawful if performed by the police
themselves." 164 It is hard to envision what the officer was doing other than
"circumventing the [F]ourth [A]mendment" by having the school officials
165
conduct the search.
Conversely, under similar circumstances, the court in F.P. v. State
ruled that the school officials were acting as agents of the police.166 Once
again, police had alerted school officials to a possible robbery. 6 7 The
school official, an SRO, interviewed the student involved, who produced
papers and car keys for a rental car that he planned to steal later.168 The
SRO then turned over the student to the officer. 169 This time, however, the
court held that "the fact that [the SRO] acted at the behest of a police officer
requires the State to prove either that appellant consented to the search or
that there existed probable cause to believe that appellant had violated the
170
law and had in his possession evidence of that violation.'
These cases are in direct opposition to each other on similar fact
patterns. It is worth noting that both cases involved SROs, and therefore
the bright-line rule suggested in this Comment-that all officers be
considered police officers for the purpose of questioning and searches and
seizures-would solve the dilemma in these cases.17 '
In P.E.A., the
involvement of the SRO in the search process would have required probable
cause for a search, putting the student on notice that he was under a
criminal investigation and not merely a school disciplinary matter. In F.P.,
the SRO clearly would have known that he needed to give a Miranda
warning, rather than needing to guess as to whether he was an agent of the

162

Id. at 386.

163

Id.at 385.

164Id.(citing People v. Chastain, 733 P.2d 1206, 1214 (Colo. 1987)).

Id.
528 So. 2d. 1253 (Fla. 1988).
167 Id. at 1254.
168 id.
169 id.
170 Id.at 1255.
171Id. at 1254; Inre P.E.A., 754 P.2d 382, 384 (Colo. 1988).
165
166
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police; he thus would not have missed the opportunity to address a criminal
problem within the school.
IV.

THE STATUS OF OFFICERS IN CURRENT CASE LAW

The converse to the question of whether school officials are agents of
the local police is the question of whether police officers can, or do, operate
as school employees. Courts are split. This Part will survey the cases that
address this question. Courts generally hold either (1) that the SROs are
themselves school employees, and therefore are neither subject to the
requirement to give Miranda warnings during interrogations, nor to the
probable cause standard for searches and seizures, or (2) that SROs are
police officers, and therefore subject to the same strictures as any officer
would be.
Although it does not address the issue of SROs, since the Dilworth
court relies on the Supreme Court's decision in Vernonia School District
47J v. Acton, 172 a brief outline of the case is helpful. In Vernonia, the Acton
family challenged a drug testing program established for participants in
athletics, after their seventh grade son was not allowed to participate on the
football team because he and his parents refused to consent to the drug
testing. 173
The Court held that the drug testing program was
constitutional. 74 The most severe consequence for failed drug tests was a
ban from future athletic participation. 175
In finding the program
constitutional, the Court first reasoned that since participation in athletics is
voluntary, student athletes "have reason to expect intrusions upon normal
rights and privileges, including privacy."' 76 Second, the Court thought the
privacy invasion resulting from urinalysis was "not significant."' 17 7 Third,
78
the Court held that combating drug use was a compelling interest.
Significantly there were no criminal consequences to failed drug tests, tests
only applied to students who chose to be involved
in athletics, and the
179
only.
activity
that
to
relevant
all
were
consequences

172 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
'

Id. at 652.

174 Id. at 666 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
171 Id. at
176 Id. at
177 Id. at
178 Id. at
'

650.

657.
660.
663.
Id. at 666 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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A. JURISDICTIONS THAT HOLD THAT SROS AND POLICE OFFICERS IN
ARE OPERATING AS SCHOOL EMPLOYEES AND THEREFORE DO
NOT NEED TO ISSUE MIRANDA WARNINGS

Several jurisdictions have ruled that SROs are school employees. For
example, in Farmerv. State, the assistant principal, one Mr. Damron, found
Farmer in the boys' room near a window, surrounded by twelve to fifteen8
boys. 180 Damron attempted to search Farmer, and a struggle ensued.' '
Although Damron thought he saw a marijuana cigarette in Farmer's pocket,
when he searched the student in the principal's office, he found no
marijuana'82

The assistant principal then called a police officer to the

school. 183 The officer, who did not believe there was probable cause for a
marijuana arrest, recommended arrest for assault. The officer then
conducted a strip search of Farmer and found two packages of hand-rolled
cigarettes in Farmer's underwear. 84 The court ruled that the strip search
was legal, despite the admitted lack of probable cause, since the officer was
"present only because he was invited by school officials."'18 5 Therefore, the
as an
court held "the conclusion is irresistible that the officer was acting
86
extension of an arm of school discipline at the time of the search.'
Two factors are worth noting in this decision. First, the officer was not
an SRO, but instead an actual police officer on duty as an officer of the law.
It is safe to assume, afortiori,that this court would apply the same rationale
to an SRO. 187 Second, the court did not have to rule on this issue at all, as it
could have easily upheld the search on other grounds-either because
probable cause did exist, or because the search occurred after the arrest for
assault. 88 The court clearly wanted to be on the side of school discipline.
Illinois has addressed the issue of SROs specifically. 8 9 In Dilworth,
the school in question was an alternative school for students with behavioral
disorders.'9 0 At the request of teachers, Ruettiger, an SRO, searched a
different student earlier for drugs, and found none.' 9' Ruettiger then saw
Dilworth with the other student, apparently mocking him, and holding a
180

275 S.E.2d 774, 775 (Ga. 1980).

181Id.
182 Id.
183 id.
184 id.

"' Id. at 776.
186 Id.

187 Id. at

775.

Id. at 776. In fact, the court did rule on both of these issues as well. Id.
189People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310 (111. 1996).

188

190

Id. at 312.

191 Id. at

313.
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flashlight. 92 Ruettiger, who intuited that the drugs were hidden in the
flashlight, immediately seized and searched it, finding cocaine. 193 In his
testimony, Ruettiger stated he thought that flashlights were banned items at
the school (under a policy banning anything which could be used as a
weapon), although he conceded that it could not be considered "contraband
per se."'t 94 The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the
evidence, but the Illinois Appellate Court overturned and granted the
motion. 195
Appealing to the Illinois Supreme Court, the State advanced two
reasons for reversing the appellate decision: "(1) Ruettiger properly seized
the flashlight as contraband because defendant's possession ...violated the
school's disciplinary guidelines; and (2) Ruettiger had reasonable suspicion,
96
as well as probable cause if required, to seize and search the flashlight."'
The court noted that the United States Supreme Court, in TL.O., had stated
that reasonableness applies "to a search of a student 'by a teacher or other
school official,"' but had not commented on the status of SROs within
schools. 197 Examining post-TL.O. decisions, the court found the weight of
authority to be in favor of treating SROs at school employees.' 98 The court
characterized the search as a "liaison police officer conducting a search on
his own initiative and authority."' 99 However, as the search was "in
furtherance of the school's attempt to maintain a proper educational
environment," the court then held that "the reasonable suspicion standard
applie[d]" and overturned the appellate decision.2 00 The court noted that it
was consistent with prior precedent; however, that precedent involved
outside officers acting at the behest of the school.20 ' Interestingly, the court

192

Id.

193 Id.
194

Id.

Id. at 314.

'9'
196 Id.
197

Id. at 316 (internal citation omitted).

198 Id.at 317 (citing Inre S.F., 607 A.2d 793, 794 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), and Wilcher v.

State, 876 S.W.2d 466, 467 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994), as in favor of this treatment, but
acknowledging that the court in A.J.M.v.State, 617 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993),
thought differently).
199 Id. (emphasis added). The court could have held that this was merely an extension of
the prior search, which was "at the behest of" the school officials. Id.at 316 (citing T.L.O,
469 U.S. 325, 341 n.7 (1985)).
200 Id.
201 Id. In Inre Boykin, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the "reasonableness" standard
in the search of a student by outside police officers at the behest of the school administration.
237 N.E.2d 460, 464 (I1. 1968).
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does not ever state outright that SROs are school employees; it only
criticizes the opinion that their only role is a law-and-order function. 0 2
The court stated that its holding was consistent with the three-pronged
test for reasonableness enunciated in Vernonia: "(1) the nature of the
privacy interest upon which the search intrudes, (2) the character of the
search, and (3) the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at
issue, and the efficacy of the means for meeting it."' 20 3 Regarding the first
factor, the court notes that school children have a reduced privacy interest,
because of "schools' custodial and tutelary responsibility for children. 20 4
Further, since Ruettiger "had an individualized suspicion" regarding
Dilworth's flashlight, the search was "minimally intrusive. 20 5 Finally, "the
State has a compelling interest in ...maintaining its schools free from the
ravages of drugs. ' '2 ° 6 In rebuking the dissent, the Court claimed that the
primary rationale for the TL.O. and Vernonia decisions "was to protect and
maintain a proper educational environmentfor all students," and therefore
Yet, as the Dilworth court
that the dissent had missed the main issue. 0
208
noted, the case law is hardly unanimous on this point.2°
B. JURISDICTIONS THAT HOLD THAT OFFICERS ARE OFFICERS OF THE
LAW EVEN IN SCHOOLS
Though the post-T.L.O. cases analyzed above nibbled at the edges of
209
In
the issue, there is a pre-T.L.O. case that addresses SROs directly.
was
a
that
the
SRO
York
held
court
in
New
appellate
People v. Bowers, an
210
The
"law enforcement officer and should not be equated with a teacher.,
defendant had been initially detained, in school, on suspicion of robbery,

202

Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d at 317 (noting that Ruettiger was "handling both criminal

activity and disciplinary problems").
203
204

Id. (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)).
Id. (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656).

Id.
Id.
207 Id. at 319. The dissent distinguished between officers employed by the police and
those employed by the school district. Id. at 322 (Nickels, J., dissenting). Since Ruetigger
was employed by the police, the dissent stated that probable cause must apply. Id. It is
hardly apparent that students would have any idea which school officer is hired by police
and which by the school district. For that reason, I agree with the majority that this is a
distinction without meaning. Id. at 320 (majority opinion).
205

206

Id. at 317 (citing In re S.F., 607 A. 2d 793, 794 (Pa. 1992) and Wilcher v. State, 876
S.W.2d 466, 467 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) for support, but acknowledging that the court
disagreed inA.J.M v. State, 617 So.2d 1137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
209 People v. Bowers, 356 N.Y.S.2d 432 (App. Div. 1974).
208

210

Id. at 435.
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But the

victim told the SRO that the defendant was not the perpetrator prior to any
questioning regarding the theft.2t 2 As the student was dismissed from the
school office, the SRO noticed a manila envelope in the student's pocket,
requested to inspect the envelope, and found marijuana inside.2t 3
The court held that the evidence was properly excluded, and in so
doing noted that at minimum, the officer was a "governmental agent,"
having the "authority of a peace officer," and was responsible to the "Police
Commissioner.,' 2 14 The court cited a prior New York appellate case, in
which a security officer at a hospital was also required to act "only on
probable cause., 21 5 In so doing, the court makes a powerful and persuasive
argument:
It is, in fact, cynical to hold that the Fourth Amendment protections apply to

searches by police officers but not to other agents of the city who are required to
perform like governmental functions and clothed with the color of authority to make
arrests. The government may not appoint agents to perform governmental functions,
as here, and at the same time claim that they
2 1 6 are immune from constitutional
restrictions placed upon governmental authority.

C. JURISDICTIONS WITH AMBIGUOUS LAW ON THE STATUS OF SROS

Some jurisdictions have had cases with fact patterns conducive to
deciding the status of SROs, but have either punted, or left opinions so
muddled by multiple concurrences that the law remains unclear. The
Florida court avoided the issue in A.JM., in which the SRO on staff at a
Florida middle school, Officer William Massey, searched a group of
students at the request of the principal." 7 A.J.M., who was in the office at
the time of the request, jumped up and ran away from the office.2t8 Massey
caught him and found cocaine in his possession. 21 9 The court noted that
under T.L.O., "school officials do not need probable cause to justify a
search"; rather, "reasonableness" is the appropriate standard.22 °
However, "the Supreme Court specifically noted that it was
considering only those searches carried out by school officials acting alone
211 Id.

at 433.

id.
213 id.
212

Id.
Id.
216 Id.
214
215

A.J.M. v. State, 617 So.2d 1137, 1137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
at 1137-38.
219 Id. at 1138.
220 Id.
217

218 Id.
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and on their own authority" and it was not addressing searches "in
Under the Florida
conjunction with or at the behest of the police. 221
officer directs,
law
enforcement
"Where
a
court's own precedent,
participates[,] or acquiesces in a search conducted by private parties, that
search must comport with usual constitutional standards. 222 Therefore,
since the officer conducted the actual search, the "appropriate test" for the
validity of the search was probable cause.223 As there was no evidence
cause, it was remanded for the granting of the motion to
regarding probable
224
suppress.
While the court clearly treated Officer Massey as law enforcement, it
did not address the question of why SROs should be considered law
enforcement. On this issue, the court merely noted that "the state did not
argue that the [SRO] was not an officer for the purpose of applying the
probable cause standard. 2 25 Though the issue had been raised in a prior
case, "it was not resolved since that was unnecessary in light of the court's
holding. 226 What then to make of this holding? On the one hand, the court
appears to be taking a pass on the issue. On the other hand, if the court felt
the SRO were a school official needing only reasonable suspicion, it is not
clear that the omission on the part of the state would prevent that.
Florida is a model of clarity, however, in comparison to the divided
The Pennsylvania criminal case involved
court in Pennsylvania. 2 7
vandalism to a classroom in which the perpetrator left a footprint indicating
someone of "small stature. 228 The SROs chose to interrogate R.H. because
he had class in that room, was of "small stature," and had a prior history of
bad behavior.229 Once the SROs located R.H., they asked for his shoe,
matched it to the print, and refused to return the shoe while interrogating
him for twenty-five minutes. 230 He was not given Miranda warnings, and
during his interrogation, he confessed to the crime. 231 In his motion to
suppress the evidence from his interrogation, R.H. claimed that "school

227

Id.
Id. (quoting M.J. v. State, 399 So. 2d 996, 998 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
Id.
id.
Id. n.1.
Id.
See In re R.H., 791 A.2d 331 (Pa. 2002) (plurality opinion).

228

Id. at 332.

221
222
223
224
225
226

229

Id.

230

Id. Of course, a Miranda warning is only required when there is a "custodial

interrogation."

Id. at 332 n.1 (citation omitted). The court makes much of describing the

holding of the shoe as a "custodial interrogation," id. at 333-34, but that issue is outside the
scope of this Comment.
231 Id. at 332.
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police are constitutionally indistinguishable from municipal police because
they are permitted to exercise the same powers as the municipal
police ....
,232
After hearing the appeal, the seven members of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania issued five opinions, none of which garnered even two
votes. 3 a The motion to suppress garnered a plurality, but there was not
even a plurality on the issue of whether an SRO should be considered an
officer of the law.234 The lead opinion, authored by Justice Nigro, stated
that although "school police officers ...were employees of the school
district, they were.., explicitly authorized to exercise the same powers as
municipal police on school property., 235 Further, they were in uniform with
badges.236 Finally, the interrogation led to criminal charge-"not [merely]
punishment by school officials pursuant to school rules. 2 37 Therefore,
Justice Nigro stated that the SROs were "were 'law enforcement officers'
within the purview of Miranda. 238
The first concurrence, by Justice Newman, objected to the "creation of
a per se rule requiring Miranda warnings whenever a student is questioned
by police on school grounds. 239 Rather, the determination of whether
Miranda warnings were necessary would be made through a balancing test
to determine whether "the constitutional interests of the student outweigh
the interest of the school in solving the crime., 240 This test would have five
factors: (1) the student's age, (2) the student's ability to understand
Miranda warnings, (3) the seriousness of the offense, (4) the prospect of
criminal proceedings, and (5) the coerciveness of the environment during
questioning.2 4 This calculation would, in some cases, even require school
teachers to Mirandize students in investigations initiated by
principals and
242
school.
the
The second concurrence, written by Justice Saylor, also expressed
243
misgivings about the per se rule announced in the lead opinion.
232

Id. at 333.

233

Id. at 335 (noting that the other two justices did not participate in the decision).
See id. For a more thorough dissection of these opinions, see Holland, supra note 77,

234

at 45.

235 In re R.H., 791 A.2d at 334.
236

Id.

237

Id.

238 Id.
240

Id. at 346 (Newman, J., concurring).
Id. at 348.

241

Id.

242

See id. at 348-49. As a former middle school dean, I can only say that the job is hard

239

enough as it is, without adding a five-factor legal test to disciplinary procedures.
243 Id. at 349 (Saylor, J., concurring).
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However, Justice Saylor opined that the involvement of "uniformed school
police officers" creates a "significant change in dynamics in encounters"
with students. 2 " Under an analysis of the "totality" of the particular facts in
this case, Miranda warnings were required. 45 However, Justice Saylor
or
gave no guidelines for determining which factors are more important,
246
even which factors must be considered in analyzing specific cases.
Both dissents argued "that there is no distinction between school
,,24'
Their
police officers and other school staff for Miranda purposes..
dispute was over the issue of whether a custodial interrogation occurred,
decided to take up, 248 even though it was not an
which the second dissent
24 9
issue before the court.
V. THE CLARIFICATION OF THE ROLE OF SCHOOL SECURITY OFFICERS ON
CAMPUS WILL BRING CLARITY TO SCHOOL EVIDENTIARY QUESTIONS

A. THE PROPOSED NEW RULE

Fundamentally, the question in the background of all of these issues is
whether the actors, be they school officials or school security officers, act as
school employees or as police officers. These questions would be resolved
with a bright-line rule establishing that police officers are police officers at
all times, whether acting at the behest of the police department or the
school, and whether they are SROs or outside police officers on campus for
a specific crime. Therefore, officers and SROs would always have to
follow standard police protocol for interrogations and searches. This rule
has the benefit of clarity for all involved.
Officers will benefit because their role within the school, and the
standard of whether they must give Miranda warnings to students, or if they
can pursue searches based merely on reasonable suspicion, will be clear.
Being held to a consistent standard will help officers make the type of splitsecond decisions often required in-school disciplinary actions.
School officials will also benefit from clear guidelines. There would
be no reason to involve SROs in ordinary disciplinary matters under such a
scheme. With clear roles, administrators would have the ability to
demonstrate discretion for marginal behavior, treating it as a criminal
matter only when necessary.
244

Id. at 350.

245

Id.

246

See id. at 349-50.

dissenting); see id. at 341 (Castille, J., dissenting).
247 Id. at 335 (Cappy, J.,
248 See id. at 337 (Cappy, J., dissenting).
249 See id. (noting that both parties agreed that custodial interrogation took place).
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Finally, students will benefit both directly and indirectly. Students
will benefit directly from the clarity of the rule because they will know that
when they speak to an officer within school, they must treat that
conversation the same as they would at a police station. It should not be
forgotten that the very demographic that is directly affected by this
confusing jumble of evidentiary law is the least sophisticated demographic
that interacts with police on a regular basis. This sad irony is reflected in a
number of the cases above, in which students freely confessed during inschool interrogations only to face significant legal consequences as a result.
Students may benefit indirectly if a bright-line between schools and
police causes school administrators to think carefully before involving the
police in the disciplining of minor infractions. This may help restore proper
balance to school discipline procedures, so that only truly criminal behavior
is treated criminally. None of this would impact the ability of schools to
respond swiftly and decisively to disciplinary matters; school administrators
would not have these constraints, and therefore could continue to rely on
reasonable suspicion standards.
B. LEGAL SUPPORT FOR A BRIGHT-LINE RULE
As noted above in several of the decisions discussed, the Court in
T.L.O. was careful to note that it was considering "only searches carried out
by school authorities acting alone and on their own authority. ' ,250 To try
and graft T.L.O. onto analysis of the role of SROs is inappropriate.
Therefore, this issue is best analyzed de novo. Several cases support the
logic of treating these officers as SROs.
First, there are a number of cases in which the Court has required
governmental actors who were not police to follow Fourth Amendment
search and seizure protocols. These are enumerated in the T.L.O. decision:
Accordingly, we have held the Fourth Amendment applicable to the activities of
civil as well as criminal authorities: building inspectors, see Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967), Occupational Safety and Health Act inspectors, see
Marshallv. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-313 (1978), and even firemen entering

privately owned premises to battle a fire, see Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S.
251499, 506
(1978), are all subject to the restraints imposed by the Fourth Amendment.

Given the remainder of the T.L.0. analysis, it seems that school
officials themselves are only exempt from these requirements because of
the countervailing policy of a school's "legitimate need to maintain an
252
environment in which leaming can take place[.]
250

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 n.7 (1985).

251
252

Id. at 335.
Id. at 340.
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Further, the warrantless searches upheld in Vernonia had no criminal
sanctions.2 53 This limited application and the tailored nature of the search
(only athletes, a self-selecting group, were subject) were the reasons the
Court upheld the practice.2 54 As the Court stated in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District, students do not lose their
constitutional rights when they walk through "the schoolhouse gate., 255
Opponents may argue that the interest in maintaining safe schools is
important enough that all government officials acting in schools should be
able to operate on reasonable suspicion: administrators, teachers, and
police. There are two objections to this. First, it is not clear that this policy
makes schools materially safer, and the burden ought to be on those who
want to infringe on the rights of students to show that the infringement is
achieving some higher goal.25 6 Second, the Court has recently disallowed
intrusive searches in which a similar policy goal was at stake. 257 In
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the hospital instituted a drug testing
program due to the prevalence of cocaine use among pregnant mothers at
their hospital.258 These results were then turned over to the police, who
used them to coerce the mothers into treatment. 259 What bothered the Court
most is that the policy "was designed to obtain evidence of criminal
26
' 0
conduct by the, tested patients that would be turned over to the police.
The hospital attempted to argue that the real purpose was to direct women
cocaine. 261
to treatment and save their fetuses from harm when they used
That is a persuasive goal, but the problem was that the plan really
accomplished something else.
That is precisely the issue with SROs. They come with an admirable
goal-to help maintain a safe and secure learning environment. However,
in reality they merely help grease the wheels of the criminal justice system,
even when it comes at the expense of a child.

253

See generally Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). There were no

criminal sanctions even though the behavior discovered was, in fact, criminal. This is a rare
instance in recent cases in which schools have tried to educate and provide resources for
students using drugs, rather than treating it purely as a law and order issue.
254 Id. at 662.
255 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
256 See generally SKIBA, supra note 18, at 7-10 (discussing the effectiveness of zero-

tolerance policies).
257 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
258 Id. at 70.
259 Id. at 71-72.
260 Id. at 86.

261 Id.at 81.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The last twenty years have been characterized by an increase in harsh
discipline measures in schools, such as suspensions and expulsions, zerotolerance policies, increased police presence, and even criminal treatment of
actions that used to be handled as school disciplinary matters only. These
policy decisions have increased the frequency of juvenile interaction with
the law, creating the school-to-prison pipeline. Though the factors are
many, one key piece of the puzzle is the ambiguous status of police officers
in schools, particularly school resource officers. The time has come to treat
police interaction with students uniformly, whether in school or out, and
whether the officer is acting on police initiative, or at the behest of schools.
This bright line rule has the benefit of clarity for all stakeholders, students,
administrators, police, and parents, and will therefore have the effect of
increased fairness in school disciplinary enforcement.

